America’s Supply Chain Is a Crime Scene — And This Week Showed Why We Must Connect the Intelligence Commander Michael Ware’s Weekly Supply Chain, Organized Retail Crime & Cargo Theft
September 27, 2026
This week reinforced something those of us working organized retail crime and cargo theft have understood for some time: America’s supply chain is no longer simply a transportation system. It is an increasingly attractive operating environment for sophisticated criminal organizations.
We are seeing freight fraud, fictitious pickups, cargo diversion, railroad theft, organized retail theft, narcotics trafficking and weapons movement intersect with legitimate commercial transportation. At the same time, criminals are exploiting digital identities, carrier credentials, GPS vulnerabilities and gaps between jurisdictions.
The response cannot be another isolated initiative from one police department, retailer, railroad or trucking company.
The answer is an intelligence network capable of moving information as quickly as criminals move merchandise.
A National Supply-Chain Enforcement Model Takes Shape
On September 24, law-enforcement and private-sector partners participated in a coordinated national supply-chain enforcement initiative led by the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department under the leadership of Sheriff Thomas J. Dart.
The operation brought together law enforcement, railroad partners, cargo-security organizations and private-sector stakeholders around a common mission: identifying and disrupting criminal activity affecting the movement of goods.
Preliminary operational reporting from participating partners identified activity involving stolen freight, rail-container crime, stolen commercial vehicles, narcotics and weapons interdiction, and high-value cargo recoveries. Because the national results are still being reconciled among participating agencies, those figures should be considered preliminary rather than final national statistics.
The significance of the operation goes beyond any single arrest or recovery.
Cargo crime is inherently mobile. A fraudulent pickup can begin in one state, be cross-docked in another, stored in a third and ultimately sold hundreds of miles away.
A national response gives investigators something they rarely possess when working individual incidents:
a larger intelligence picture.
That is where the real value of coordinated enforcement begins.
Michigan Traffic Stop Exposes the Criminal Potential Inside Commercial Freight
One of the most striking developments of the week occurred in Michigan.
On September 24, Michigan State Police motor-carrier officers stopped a semitruck on Interstate 69 near Marshall.
Authorities subsequently reported recovering approximately 167 kilograms—about 368 pounds—of suspected heroin and 174 handguns whose serial numbers had been obliterated. The driver was arrested, and the investigation remains ongoing.
Those allegations remain under investigation, but the operational lesson is already significant.
Commercial transportation enforcement is supply-chain security.
The tractor-trailer moving legitimately through our interstate system is one of the foundations of the American economy. Criminal organizations understand that the enormous volume of legitimate freight also provides opportunities to conceal illegal commodities.
That means cargo-security intelligence should not exist separately from narcotics, firearms, highway interdiction and organized-crime intelligence.
Different investigative units may be looking at different pieces of the same network.
Laredo: Commercial-Vehicle Inspection Finds More Than 153 Pounds of Narcotics
Texas provided another example this week.
On September 22, a commercial-vehicle inspection at the Laredo Port of Entry uncovered more than 153 pounds of narcotics, according to the Texas Department of Public Safety.
Authorities reported recovering 94 pounds of fentanyl, 26 pounds of methamphetamine, 18 pounds of heroin and 15 pounds of eutylone. DPS estimated the drugs’ street value at more than $1.4 million and said the fentanyl represented nearly 20 million potentially lethal doses. Two people were arrested and charged with felony possession of a controlled substance.
The investigation involved Texas DPS and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Again, the broader lesson is collaboration.
Commercial-vehicle inspections, cargo intelligence, border enforcement and criminal investigations should not be viewed as separate disciplines when criminal organizations are using the same transportation infrastructure.
Cargo-Security Professionals Are Increasingly Concerned About Fraudulent Pickups
A newly released industry survey provides useful context for what investigators are seeing operationally.
A SmartSense survey of 150 U.S.-based loss-prevention and ORC professionals found 79% said they were more concerned about cargo theft than ever before, while 63% reported cargo-theft incidents had increased compared with the previous year.
Among the tactics respondents were most concerned about were:
Fraudulent pickups and carrier impersonation — 78%
GPS jamming and spoofing — 71%
Trailer theft — 66%
Double brokering — 64%
Forty percent of respondents reported annual cargo-theft losses of at least $1 million, while 28% reported losses exceeding $2 million.
A survey is not the same thing as national crime statistics, and those numbers should not be interpreted as a national incident count.
But the perceptions of professionals responsible for protecting merchandise are important because they closely match the tactics appearing in actual investigations.
The criminal attack surface is moving upstream.
Offenders increasingly want to steal the identity of the carrier before stealing the cargo.
Identity Has Become Part of the Security Perimeter
Traditional cargo security concentrated heavily on physical protection:
Locks.
Seals.
Fences.
Cameras.
Guards.
Secure yards.
Those measures remain necessary.
But the security perimeter now begins much earlier.
It begins when someone books the load.
A criminal who compromises a carrier account, impersonates a legitimate trucking company, produces fraudulent documentation or redirects electronic communications may never have to defeat the physical security system.
The freight may simply be released to them.
That means high-value cargo should increasingly require layered authentication.
Verify the carrier.
Verify the driver.
Verify the tractor.
Verify the trailer.
Verify the destination.
Verify last-minute changes independently.
And when something changes unexpectedly, stop the transaction until the discrepancy is resolved.
Rail Cargo Theft Remains a Serious Vulnerability
California continues to demonstrate the challenges surrounding rail cargo.
Recent reporting described thieves breaching freight containers and throwing packages from trains in the Cajon Pass area. Separate incidents this month have involved large groups targeting freight trains elsewhere in Southern California.
The imagery may resemble a crime from another era, but the intelligence problem is entirely modern.
Rail offenders can combine knowledge of train movements, geography, commodity information, vehicle staging and rapid resale networks.
Rail theft therefore should not be treated simply as trespassing or container burglary.
Investigators should ask:
Who is transporting the merchandise away?
Where is it being stored?
Who is purchasing it?
What vehicles repeatedly appear near targeted rail corridors?
What phones or social-media accounts connect the participants?
Where does the merchandise ultimately re-enter legitimate or illicit commerce?
The container burglary may be only the first visible component of a much larger organization.
Organized Retail Crime: The Case Does Not End at the Store Door
This week’s developments also continue to reinforce the importance of coordinated retail-theft enforcement.
Reporting published September 23 described a Portland operation that resulted in 13 arrests, recovery of a stolen vehicle and the closure of more than 81 open cases associated with one suspect investigation.
The operation brought together multiple units of the Portland Police Bureau, the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office and the Organized Retail Crime Association of Oregon.
That collaborative model matters.
The objective should not simply be catching someone walking out of a store with merchandise.
The investigative questions begin after that arrest.
Where was the merchandise going?
Who ordered it?
Who finances the theft?
Who buys it?
Where is it stored?
How is it advertised?
How are the proceeds moved?
A prolific retail offender can generate dozens of police reports across several jurisdictions without any one investigator initially realizing those cases belong to the same enterprise.
Intelligence connects the reports into the organization.
ORC and Cargo Theft Are Moving Toward the Same Criminal Ecosystem
The artificial wall between organized retail crime and cargo theft becomes less useful every year.
A fencing organization does not necessarily care whether merchandise came from a retail store, distribution center, railroad container or tractor-trailer.
It cares whether the product can be sold.
Electronics.
Cosmetics.
Fragrance.
Apparel.
Copper.
Tools.
Pharmaceutical products.
High-demand consumer merchandise.
The commodity changes.
The criminal business model often does not.
That is why ORC investigators should understand cargo theft, and cargo investigators should understand fencing and organized retail crime.
Each may possess intelligence the other needs.
Technology: More Data Is Not the Same as Better Intelligence
Technology remains one of our greatest opportunities—but only when it produces action.
GPS tracking, RFID, covert trackers, license-plate recognition, trailer telematics, geofencing, video analytics and digital identity tools can dramatically improve supply-chain visibility.
But collecting information is not the mission.
Using it is.
A GPS tracker showing a stolen load entering a warehouse is useful only if that information reaches investigators quickly enough to act.
A license-plate reader hit becomes significantly more valuable when analysts recognize that the vehicle appeared in three other cargo or retail-theft investigations.
An RFID alert matters when the retailer and police department already have procedures for communicating and responding.
The strongest technology strategy therefore is not simply:
Buy more technology.
It is:
Connect technology to intelligence and intelligence to operations.
Federal Policy: CORCA Remains an Important National Conversation
The Combating Organized Retail Crime Act passed the U.S. House earlier this year and remains part of the federal discussion surrounding organized retail and supply-chain crime.
Among its central concepts is improved coordination among federal, state and local law enforcement and private-sector partners.
There are legitimate policy discussions surrounding any major federal legislation.
But from an operational perspective, the underlying problem is undeniable.
A detective in Illinois should not discover months later that the same carrier identity, telephone number, warehouse or suspect vehicle appeared in cargo-theft investigations in California, Texas and Georgia.
The intelligence architecture has to improve.
What This Means for the Week Ahead
Build relationships before the theft occurs. Investigators should know the retailers, railroads, carriers, brokers, manufacturers and cargo-security professionals operating within their jurisdictions before an emergency develops.
Make identity verification part of cargo security. High-value loads should receive independent verification of the driver, carrier, equipment and destination.
Treat unexpected changes as indicators. Last-minute changes involving drivers, telephone numbers, email addresses, delivery locations or equipment deserve additional verification.
Connect commercial-vehicle enforcement to organized-crime intelligence. Highway interdiction can reveal networks extending far beyond traffic enforcement.
Follow merchandise beyond recovery. A recovered load is a success, but the warehouse, fence, buyer, online account and financial trail may lead investigators to the larger organization.
Integrate ORC and cargo intelligence. Investigators should routinely examine whether retail and freight cases share suspects, vehicles, storage locations or resale channels.
Use technology operationally. Trackers, LPRs, RFID and telematics should feed established response protocols rather than isolated databases.
Measure coordinated operations beyond arrests. Leads generated, criminal relationships identified, stolen-property networks disrupted and intelligence shared may ultimately matter as much as arrest totals.
Closing: We Have to Move Intelligence Faster Than Criminals Move Freight
This week’s events demonstrated the scale of the challenge—but they also demonstrated the solution.
Criminal organizations survive because they exploit separation.
Separation between jurisdictions.
Separation between law enforcement and industry.
Separation between retail investigators and cargo investigators.
Separation between cyber intelligence and physical security.
Separation between the theft and the fence.
Every time we eliminate one of those gaps, we make the criminal enterprise more vulnerable.
Our goal cannot simply be recovering the next stolen trailer or making the next retail-theft arrest.
We have to identify the organization behind the incident.
That requires intelligence sharing, technology, prevention, proactive enforcement and sustained public-private partnerships.
The criminals are already connected.
We have to be better connected.
Follow the freight. Follow the merchandise. Follow the money. Find the fence. Verify the identity. Connect the intelligence. Disrupt the organization.
Commander Michael Ware
Organized Retail Crime | Cargo Theft | Supply Chain Security | Intelligence Sharing | Public-Private Partnerships
Current-source reading: Texas DPS — Sept. 25 commercial-vehicle narcotics seizure release · CBS Detroit — Sept. 26 Michigan semitruck seizure · SmartSense cargo-theft survey coverage — Sept. 26 · Portland retail-theft operation — Sept. 23/

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